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1 Introduction
”We need a small, victorious war to avert a revolution” is a phrase often at-
tributed to Vyacheslav Plehve, minister of interior of the Russian Empire at the
edge of the 20th century and one of the strongest proponents of the military
engagement against Japan. A similar idea of a ”small victorious war” seems
to be present in many non-democratic political systems, when the dictators use
military conflicts (even against superior enemy) as an instrument to ensure the
survival of the government. Ironically, many autocrats overestimated the power
of their armed forces, and the resulting defeat actually triggered regime changes;
however, in some cases ”small victorious wars” indeed turn out to be a good
instrument of regime stabilization. Moreover, this type of conflicts is often initi-
ated by the democratic political systems, where military success in a small and
fast conflict can become an effective tool of influencing the behavior of the voters.
The idea underlying the ”small victorious war” logic is in fact very simple: if
a country experiences a domestic political conflict, investments in armed forces
and initiation of an external war can be used to achieve the victory ”at home”
as well. Basically, investments in an international and in a domestic war can
be treated as complementary in this case. In particular, three factors could be
driving this complementarity.
First, in non-democracies army is often used to suppress internal political dis-
sidents and rebels, and hence, creating strong military forces may be used to
fight opposition. Even regimes with very strong internal political police were
forced to rely on military in case of major political turbulences, like the Soviet
Union for the Novocherkassk workers’ riots in 1962 (see Kozlov, 1999). However,
when the strong army exists, the involvement in international conflicts becomes
ceteris paribus more attractive (and, in addition, sustaining large army as a
combat-ready force without wars is often difficult) - so, creating a large army
to fight internal opposition is likely to induce incentives to engage in ”small
victorious wars”. This case is probably the less explored in the literature, and
the model presented in this paper focuses explicitly on this scenario.
Second, investments in army may be a hidden form of bribes to the military,
preventing it from taking over the power through a coup. These investments,
however, are not so harmless, since the military is a well-known source of politi-
cal threats for any regime: as Finer (2002: 5) puts it, ”instead of asking why the
military engages in politics, we ought surely ask why they ever do otherwise”.
Investing in army therefore constitutes a threat for the autocrat;1 however, not
investing in army can be even more dangerous. So, one possible alternative can
be to create a military force and then let it engage in an external conflict, satis-
1In fact, the coup can turn out to be ”the only successful operation of the army”, as the
president of Bolivia Daniel Salamanca supposedly said to the generals, who removed him
from office after the long and completely unsuccessful Chaco War in the first half of the 20th
century.
2
fying the ambitions of the generals and distracting them from domestic politics.
In addition, if a country experiences strong domestic political instability, the
military turns into an autonomous actor in decisions over war and peace, and,
as Dassel and Reinhardt (1999) show, is likely to initiate an international war.
Finally, the success in international conflicts seems to act as a sort of ”mul-
tiplier” for the government’s position in any sort of internal disputes - from
elections to conflicts within ruling elite - simply because public opinion is often
in favor of the victorious warlord. This is a well-known scenario of the ”diver-
sionary war”, systematically analyzed in the political science literature. While
the previous two scenarios are rather typical for non-democracies or very weak
democracies, ”diversionary wars” constitute an important element of the demo-
cratic policy-making as well. The empirical research on the ”diversionary wars”
so far produced highly inconclusive results (Levy, 1989; Leeds and Davis, 1997),
which seem to be dependent on a variety of factors, including domestic political
structure (Miller, 1995), level of support from critical domestic groups (Morgan
and Bickers, 1992), access to domestic repressions (Gelpi, 1997) and presence of
unresolved issues between countries (Mitchell and Tyne, 2009).
The aim of this paper is to provide an extremely simple theoretical model pre-
dicting the possible ”small victorious war”. It looks at a standard two-country
setup used in the economics of conflict, but modifies it by including political
bias and domestic struggle for redistribution of rents. From that point of view it
is related to two literatures. First, in economics a number of theoretical studies
examine the interaction of international and domestic conflicts (Garfinkel, 1994,
2004; Muenster, 2007; Muenster and Staal, 2010). In this literature an external
and an internal conflict are treated as substitutes: external conflict diminishes
the value of domestic prize parties compete for or reduces the resources at hand
to successfully fight the domestic war. This paper also uses the tools of the
economics of conflict to predict the ”small victorious war” outcomes and does
rely on fully rational agents without any information asymmetry - so, it can be
treated as complementary to these papers. However, the driving mechanism of
my model is different: spending for an international conflict is not a substitute
for the domestic warfare, but complementary to it and increases the probability
of victory in the domestic war. It has an important normative implication: in
the model presented in this paper it is possible to straightforwardly show that
the existence of the domestic conflict results in an overspending for international
warfare, which is in fact inefficient from the point of view of the overall revenue
at disposal of the nation.
The second literature is mostly associated with the political science and deals
specifically with the ”diversionary wars” (Richards et al., 1993; Smith, 1996;
Tarar, 2006). The idea of these studies is to show that the external war can
be attractive for the incumbent political leader to gather domestic support.
The model of this paper is different from this literature in several respects.
First, almost all papers of the ”diversionary war” studies do not model wars
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as such, concentrating on the domestic policy (and describing the international
war as a simple lottery rather than an outcome of the strategic interaction of
two players) - hence, potential changes in the behavior of foreign opponents
are ignored (see Chiozza and Goemans, 2004). A recent exception is Arena
(2007), who, however, looks primarily on the problem of escalation of potential
military disputes. Second, the ”diversionary wars” literature heavily relies on
the information asymmetry between politicians and electorate. There are some
recent exceptions (Goemans and Fey, 2009), but they still treat the war as a
purely random lottery. In my model no uncertainty or informational problems
are required. Finally, the ”diversionary wars” models usually concentrate on the
democratic political regimes (see Levy, 1998:153). However, although the diver-
sionary behavior is indeed shown to be more typical for democracies (Miller,
1999; Heldt, 1999; Mitchell and Prins, 2004), the examples above demonstrate
that autocracies often engage in ”small victorious wars” as well (Pickering and
Kisangani, 2010). Gent (2009) does incorporate different regimes and an explicit
model of the attacking and defending states in the model, but still focuses on
the incomplete information setup. In addition, the ”diversionary wars” models
always look just at the third reason for the ”small victorious wars” as it has
been introduced above (as it in fact follows from the very label of the literature).
The model of this paper concentrates on non-democratic regimes and introduces
a number of different driving forces for the political behavior: for instance, the
political bias for the rents obtained by the autocrat from the external war and
the peacetime production.
The structure of the paper is the following. The next section introduces the
reference model without domestic conflict. The third section looks at the effect
of domestic conflicts on military spending and probability of war. The fourth
section distinguishes between small and large wars and looks at potential differ-
ences of the impact of domestic conflict for these two settings. The fifth section
offers a discussion of the main findings of the model using a number of anecdotal
case studies of ”small victorious wars” initiated by the non-democratic regimes.
The last section concludes.
2 Reference model without domestic conflict
Assume that the world consists of two countries A and B, fighting for a given
resource V. The probability of country B to gain control over resources is
pw =
mb
ma +mb
(1)
if the investments of at least one party in the conflict are non-zero and .5 oth-
erwise. The war happens if both parties invest a non-zero effort in warfare; if
only one party makes military investments and the other does not, it is assumed
that the second party surrenders. mi for i = A,B denotes the investments in
warfare. Both countries are endowed with identical resources R. The resources
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spent for the war could be alternatively used for productive activity, and both
countries have linear production functions; so, each unit of resource R invested
in productive activity yields βa units of output in country A and respectively βb
units in country B (this is actually the main driving force for obtaining peaceful
equilibria in the model; see also Bennour, 2009). In the reference model let me
ignore the internal conflict in countries A and B and focus exclusively on the
international warfare. The payoffs of both conflict parties are denoted by
pia = (1− pw)V + βa(R−ma) (2)
and
pib = pwV + βb(R−mb) (3)
In this case one can immediately show that
Proposition 1: (i) The war takes place if and only if at least one of the
following cases holds: (a) βaβb ∈ (.5, 2), (b)
βa
βb
≤ .5 and Vβb ≥ R and (c)
βa
βb
≥ 2
and Vβa ≥ R; (ii) if V > βiR, zero investments in war are never optimal for the
country i.
Proof: See Appendix
Hence the probability of war is increasing if countries are sufficiently poor (as
opposed to the size of V ) and just cannot afford investing too much in prevent-
ing military confrontation or if countries are rich enough, but relatively similar
to each other in terms of relative productivity of alternative use of resources
averted from military spending to peaceful production.2 I will assume for the
time being that both opponents are able to invest sufficiently large resources
in war and restrict attention to case (a) of Proposition 1. The second result
of the Proposition follows from the symmetricity of countries in terms of their
endowment: since any country cannot send more on war than R, then if the
peacetime production revenue is smaller than the expected prize, even if the
opponent spends everything on war, it is still optimal not to surrender.
3 Dictator as aggressor
Now consider the case when the country B is ruled by a dictator, who takes
away an exogenous share of rents d produced in the country. The population
keeps the rest of the rents. Analogously, the dictator receives a share dw of
the revenue from war against A. The ratio d
w
d is the political bias (Jackson
and Morelli, 2007), i.e. relative gain from war as opposed to the gains from
the peacetime production. For the country B I assume dw ∈ [d; 1], that is, the
ruler receives at least as much from the external conflicts as from the peacetime
2This is not surprising: the claim of Hirshleifer (1989) that the conflict is unavoidable in a
ratio success function is made exactly for the case when βa = βb = 1.
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production at home and the political bias is larger or equal to one.3 Obviously,
the public dislikes the oppression by the dictator and is willing to rebel. The
rebellion is modeled as an additional (internal) conflict: so, there are two se-
quential conflicts: an external (war) and an internal (rebellion). The rebellion
is also described with a ratio conflict success function, where both dictator and
public invest fraction of their revenue in weapons.4 The timing of events is the
following: first the countries engage in war. After the war, the revolution takes
place in both countries. In the country A d = dw = 0, and hence, the public
always spends zero on the rebellion (because there is nothing to gain) - so, its
leadership basically does not differ from that of the reference case model. I
ignore the collective action problem for the revolution: there is no ”opting out”
for individuals not participating in the revolt. Moreover, while in the first stage
the question is how to distribute the resources between military capacity and
production, in the second stage production has already been implemented; the
sides just struggle for the division of the pie.
Denoting the spending for means of internal conflict in country B as ap and
ad for the public and for the dictator respectively, one can write the payoffs of
the public and of the dictator in the country B as follows:
pip = (1− d)βb(R−mb) + (1− dw)V pw + pr(dβb(R−mb) + dwV pw)− ap (4)
pid = (1− pr)(dβb(R−mb) + dwV pw)− ad (5)
If both dictator and public invest zero effort in conflict the dictator keeps the
share of the national revenue with certainty. For the payoff of the population the
first two terms represent the share of the revenue from productive activity and
war the public receives in case the dictatorship remains in power. The third
term is the expected gain from revolution, which expropriates the revenue of
the dictator if successful (with pr being the probability of successful rebellion).
The first term in the payoff of the dictator is her revenue if the revolution is
unsuccessful; in case the rebellion is able to overthrow the current regime, the
revenue of the dictator is assumed to be zero.5 The key assumption of the model
3Of course, there are cases when the share of the revenue obtained from the conquered
territories is smaller than from the domestic ones: if there are significant costs of maintaining
control over the occupied land in presence of strong domestic opposition or if conquests are
implemented by a quasi-independent warlord, who then gets control ver the conquered land
and just delivers a fraction of the revenues to his supposed sovereign (for example, Russian
conquest of Siberia or early Spanish colonialism). The overall revenues from the conquered
territories may still be large, but because of extremely large V , which makes even smaller
dw attractive for the dictator. However, in order to properly model these cases one has to
introduce a third party (warlord or by the occupation forces) acquiring part of the resources
from the conquest, which go neither to the population of the homeland nor to the dictator. If
one assumes these costs to be exogenous, one could equivalently model the interaction I am
interested in just by reducing the size of V .
4Although for simplicity I refer to weapons, the means of internal conflict may as well
be propaganda or repressions; important is that the dictator has to spend some part of her
revenue to prevent a revolution.
5One can speculate whether this assumption is adequate, as I will do in what follows.
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is the definition of pr. Probability of success for the revolution is given by
pr =
ap
ap + adθ(mb)
(6)
where θ(mb) is assumed to be a continuous, monotonous and (for technical con-
venience) twice differentiable function, mappingmb on <0+. This term represents
the complementarity between spending on international and on domestic con-
flict. By investing in the first conflict the dictator changes the probability of the
success in the second one. If θ′(mb) < 0, the investments in army actually re-
duce the probability of success of the ruler in the revolution: for example, army
may become an alternative power center potentially dangerous for the dictator
(since it could stage a coup). If θ′(mb) > 0, military spending for external secu-
rity increases the probability of success in internal conflict. Finally, θ′(mb) = 0
means that there is no effect of external army on internal security; this case
is uninteresting and therefore left aside. Moreover, I assume θ(mb) ≥ 0 and
θ(0) = 1, i.e. if for zero military expenditures for the external war the prob-
ability of the dictator and of the public to win in the domestic revolution is
identical. Considering θ(0) < 1 would imply the virtually powerless domestic
police,6 which forces the dictator to create an otherwise useless army.
The case of θ′(mb) > 0 can be used to describe all three scenarios of the ”small
victorious war” introduced in this paper. For the direct use of the military
against opposition, the interpretation is straightforward. If one considers the
opportunity of the military coup, increasing θ indicates that by providing fund-
ing to the military the dictator reduces the opportunity of its involvement in
the domestic revolution on the side of the rebels. Finally, in the ”diversionary
war” case external aggression through large investments in army and/or asso-
ciated propaganda (which is also necessary as part of the military investments
themselves to boost morale) can be used to ”distract” the population from the
revolution: it means that the effectiveness of the population’s investments in
the rebellion go down, so, one can write pr = ap/θ(mb)ap/θ(mb)+ad , what is equivalent to
the expression (6). There is also another way of re-labeling the variables, which
I will discuss in section 5.2.
Solving the model by backward induction implies that one has to start with
the internal conflict. The first-order condition for the population is given by:
∂pip
∂ap
= −1 + adθ(mb)
(ap + adθ(mb))2
(dβb(R−mb) + dwpwV ) = 0 (7)
which yields the reaction curve of
ap =
√
adθ(mb)(dβb(R−mb) + dwpwV )− adθ(mb) (8)
6Once again, the term ”police” here is used just for simplicity: it can as well mean that
the propaganda machine of the dictator collapses or that any other measures implemented to
fight the domestic rebellion do not work.
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if adθ(mb) < dβb(R − mb) + dwpwV and zero otherwise. Now the dictator’s
problem for non-zero ap gives
∂pid
∂ad
= −1 + 1
2
√
dβb(R−mb) + dwpwV
ad
θ(mb) = 0 (9)
and therefore the optimal choice of the dictator is
ad =
dβb(R−mb) + dwpwV
4
θ(mb) (10)
The dictator’s investments are large enough to make a revolution impossible if
θ(mb) ≥ 2, i.e. the positive effect from spending on army for internal security
is large enough (recall, however, that mb is a choice variable which is set in the
first stage of the game). Otherwise the revolution takes place. On the other
hand, by similar calculations one shows that the condition for the dictator to
spend zero on internal security is ap ≥ dβb(R − mb) + dwpwV ; however, the
public always chooses ap weakly smaller than the prize to win, and hence, the
dictator always makes some investments in internal security. To conclude, the
revenue of the dictator for a given level of mb is
pid =
θ(mb)
4
(dβb(R−mb) + dwpwV ) (11)
if θ(mb) < 2. The rest is spent for internal conflict.
Now, if θ(mb) ≥ 2, the dictator, simply following (10), might ”over-invest”
in domestic conflict: it is sufficient for her just to invest enough to ensure that
ap = 0. The condition is then ad = 1θ(mb) (dβb(R − mb) + dwpwV ). One can
immediately see that for θ(mb) = 2 this condition and optimal response (10)
yield identical investments in domestic conflict; for θ(mb) > 2 the investments in
domestic conflict under (10) were higher. Thus, it is reasonable for the dictator
to invest the smallest amount possible in the revolution ensuring the surrender
of the opposition. Given ad = 1θ(mb) (dβb(R −mb) + dwpwV ), and also pr = 0,
equation (5) transforms into
pid =
θ(mb)− 1
θ(mb)
(dβb(R−mb) + dwpwV ) (12)
representing the revenue of the dictator for a given level of mb for θ(mb) ≥ 2.
From the results of internal conflict, the reaction curve of mb for given ma is
thus described by the following equations
θ′(mb)
4
(dβb(R−mb) + dwpwV ) + θ(mb)4 (−dβb + d
wV
ma
(ma +mb)2
) = 0 (13)
if θ(mb) < 2 and
θ′(mb)
θ2(mb)
(dβb(R−mb)+dwpwV )+ θ(mb)− 1
θ(mb)
(−dβb+dwV ma(ma +mb)2 ) = 0 (14)
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otherwise.
Unfortunately, there is no reason to assume that the equilibrium is unique:
both equations can have multiple solutions, meeting the constraints. It is also
possible that the equations have no solutions; in this case the equilibrium expen-
ditures are either strictly zero or R (depending upon the sign of the left-hand
side expression). However, one can still make several conclusions about the
spending on military purposes of the country B even for these general assump-
tions. I just restrict my attention to the equilibria when in case there are no
solutions to the equations satisfying the constraint on θ(mb), the optimal choice
is R and not 0.
In this model there are two effects influencing the conflict behavior. First,
there is a political bias effect. Assume pr = 0. The dictator cares only about
a fraction of national revenue, which is attributed to her own budget; from the
point of view of the dictator the nation is just less productive, because from each
unit of internal output a portion is ”wasted” as revenue of the population. If the
dictator gets a higher share of her domestic revenue, the difference between the
”real country” and the ”part of the country generating utility for the dictator”
becomes smaller, and the decision of dictator is closer to that of the reference
model leaders.7 Similarly, she cares only about a fraction of revenue from con-
flict: if dw decreases, the dictator gets a smaller share of the rent V which is
contested, and does not want to attack any more. The effect of political bias
depends upon the relation between the ratio of peacetime productivities and the
ratio of dictator’s revenue from external conflict and production of the peaceful
times, as it is shown in the Figure 1. Assume that in the reference model war
was possible only in the dotted interval (remember, that I disregard the prob-
lem of potentially lacking resources for the dictator). Now if one considers the
pure political bias effect in one country, the conflict zone moves to the shaded
area. For the political bias equal to 1 (i.e. share of peacetime production and
of revenue from war is exactly identical), there is no difference between the de-
cision of the dictator and the society without political bias; if the political bias
goes up, the lower bound of the war zone shifts to the x-axis (because dictator
will still attack even for relatively large investments of her opponent), but, on
the other hand, the upper bound also shifts downwards (because soon enough
dictator invests so much in warfare that country A surrenders).
If the rebels can win in the internal conflict with a positive probability, there is
also a second effect of domestic conflict on military spending, which I will refer
to as complementarity effect. First assume θ′(mb) > 0, i.e. armed forces support
the police in restoring internal peace. In this case, intuitively, the dictator is
likely to invest more in external conflict, than the leadership of country B in
the reference case; even if external conflict is not attractive per se, the dictator
7In fact, the idea is from a certain point of view similar to the McGuire and Olson (1996):
the desire of the dictator to engage in wasteful policies is smaller since the size of the pie also
goes down.
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Figure 1: Peaceful settlement and war equilibria if B is ruled by the dictator
and A is not: political bias effect
is still interested in providing army for internal purposes. For the country B it
is possible to claim that
Proposition 2: For an increasing θ(mb) in country B (i) even if A sets ma
large enough to ensure surrender of B in the reference case, B will not sureneder
(ii) investments in warefare of B are always stricktly larger than in the reference
case; (iii) there exists political bias
b∗ =
Rβb
V
[1−Rθ′(0)] (15)
such that for d
w
d > b
∗ the zero level of mb is never optimal; (iv) for any θˆ(.)
function such that
θˆ′(0) >
1
R
[1− d
w
d
V
βbR
] (16)
the zero level of mb is never optimal.
Proof : See Appendix
The Proposition suggests that there are two forces driving the military ex-
penditures - high political bias and low effectiveness of internal police without
military support, which act as substitutes. If the political bias is high enough,
then even a relatively small marginal increase of the strength of domestic police
through the military support at mb = 0 ensures non-zero investments. If the
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marginal increase of power of internal police is large enough, even small political
bias suffices to ensure non-zero investments. One can therefore predict that a
”small victorious war” is to be expected either if the political bias is very large
(”greedy dictator” - or dictator strongly constraint by the domestic institutions
at home, but unconstraint abroad and able to get large rents from foreign con-
quests8) or if the gains for domestic police from the military support are very
large (”army as the main power basis of the dictator”), or if both conditions
hold simultaneously. However, if the greed is too small and the internal police
does not gain a lot in terms of efficiency from the military support, dictator can
decide not to go to war.
Consider the case of θ′(mb) < 0. In this case the dictator faces a problem:
investing in military capacities she makes her demise through an internal rev-
olution more likely. There is a trade-off between the chances to get the prize
in external war and the probability to lose power - a problem often faced by
dictators with strong military forces. One can show that under these conditions
investments of A sufficient to ensure surrender of B in the reference case are
”not enough” for the case B is ruled by the dictator only if d
w
d > 1 − θ′(0)R.9
However, once again, there exists a political bias large enough so that the dic-
tator invests non-zero effort in warfare for a given θ(.). It reflects the ”greed”
of the dictator: if the political bias effect is very large, the dictator becomes too
greedy and is ready to risk an international war and to build up her military
even knowing that it will cause trouble in internal conflict (where large military
actually reduces her ability to fight the rebels). In the same way, if the reduc-
tion of power of the domestic police through investing in the military is not very
large, even moderate political bias can suffice to engage in war. In what follows
I will consider only increasing θ(mb) throughout the paper.
As a final remark, one should notice, that both the political bias and the com-
plementarity of military expenditures and the internal police (increasing θ(.))
make the conflict expenditures inefficient in the sense that the overall revenue
of the country after war (described by expression (3)) is not maximized. Hence,
the countries might engage in a war which actually reduces the overall size of
the pie available for the redistribution between the dictator and the population
(through the complementarity effect and the political bias effect). For some pa-
rameters the predictions of the model are even more extreme. As Jervis (1988)
conjectures, domestic politics (or other factors, like the willingess to impress the
third countries, which are not covered by this paper) may support the decision
of leaders to fight wars they are likely to lose. This is exactly what can happen
8One example is that of the late Roman Republic, where successful warlords could benefit
from conquering new provinces, but had to deal with strong countervailing power centers at
home. Another example is the German Empire of the late 19 century, which received direct
rule over the territories conquered from France, but had very limited access to the fiscal
resources of the member states.
9By replicating the results of Proposition 2 and noticing that in expression (28) the first
term is now negative.
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in the model presented above. Intuitively, while for fairly small probabilities of
success in the reference model the country decided to surrender, in the model
with political bias and complementarity, given a very high level of ”greed” and
very low efficiency of domestic police without military support, it can be attrac-
tive for the government to still make non-zero investments in army and hence
to go to war.10
Larger military expenditures of country B do not automatically imply, how-
ever, that there is going to be war according to the definition introduced above.
The optimal level of military expenditures may exceed Vβa , thus making country
A surrender. However, one can show that this ”over-investments” are also more
likely to occur for regimes with very high political bias and with particular θ(.)
functions. More specifically:
Proposition 3: A sufficient condition for optimal investments of country B
to ensure surrender of country A is βaβb ≥ 2dwd , if mb = V/βa is feasible given the
resource constraint R.
Proof: See Appendix.
The result of the Proposition suggests that if the political bias gets larger,
the lower boundary of the βa/βb area sufficient to ensure unilateral surrender of
A goes down (this is, by the way, also evident from Figure 1). For any political
bias exceeding 1 it is also larger than in the reference case discussed in the pre-
vious section. Hence, war actually is more likely to happen if the dictatorship
has an intermediate level of political bias.
It is, however, more difficult to make a general claim with respect to the impact
of θ(.) function on the investments ensuring the surrender of A. The reason is
10Consider for example an equilibrium associated with pw = .25 (when the chances of
winning the war are too small). Knowing that ma =
√
Vmb
βa
−mb, as I have shown in the
proof for Proposition 1, one can easily find that mb/(ma +mb) = .25 if mb =
V
16βa
. From
that follows, knowing the best response of A to any policy of B, that ma =
3V
16βa
. However,
substituting this expression into mb =
√
Vma
βb
− ma, one obtains that mb = V16βa only if
βa
βb
= 1
3
- but, as it has been shown above, for this combination of β’s war does not take
place in the reference model (of course, I once again disregard the resource constraints for
the investments in war). However, in case of an autocrat with the political bias and the
complementarity between investments in army and fight against revolution, the combination
of ma;mb equal to
3V
16βa
; V
16βa
can, as a matter of fact, be an equilibrium if, for instance,
βb = 3βa
dw
d
+
θ′( V16βa )
θ( V16βa
)
[βb(R− V16βa ) +
dw
d
V
4
] (assuming in this case θ( V
16βa
) < 2; for larger
values of θ(.) result follows analogeously from (14)). The ratio βa
βb
is actually even larger,
then in the reference case, yet if the political bias is large enough, even for this combination
B makes non-zero investments in war, and hence, war happens with the probability of victory
equal to .25.
12
that while for the purpose of Proposition 3 there is no difference between ana-
lyzing the first order conditions derived from (11) and (12), it is not the case for
the impact of the complementarity function. As a matter of fact, from (11) one
can easily show that the sufficient condition (once again, assuming the existence
of the equilibrium) for the optimalmb to be high enough to ensure the unilateral
surrender of A is that the first term of (29) is larger than the absolute value of
the second one for any mb < V/βa, what is achieved if
θ′(mb)
θ(mb)
is large enough.
However, for the first-order condition derived from (12) the same requirement of
the absolute value of the negative term being smaller than that of the positive
term is achieved for θ
′(mb)
θ(mb)(θ(mb)−1) being large enough.
In order to make the result more intuitive, consider the simplest possible com-
plementarity function satisfying conditions set up in the main part of the paper:
θ(mb) = cmb + 1, where c > 0. The advantage of this function is that it has
a constant derivative c which can be thus interpreted as the quantiative mea-
sure of complementarity: if c increases, additional military investments provide
stronger support for the internal police. Then the condition θ
′(mb)
θ(mb)
reads as
c
cmb+1
, which is decreasing in mb, but increasing in c. Thus, the level of invest-
ments ensuring unilateral surrender of the opponent is more likely to be achieved
for high c. However, θ
′(mb)
θ(mb)(θ(mb)−1) (which is relevant if the optimal mb ≥ 1/c,
i.e. θ(mb) ≥ 2) now reads as 1mb(cmb+1) , which is decreasing in c. To conclude,
one can state that for θ(mb) = cmb+1 increasing the complementarity between
domestic and international warfare does not necessarily lead to military invest-
ments ensuring the surrender of A. As a matter of fact, in the discussion I will
present several cases of very high complementarity (i.e. when domestic police
was obviously inadequate to fight the rebellion), where investments in war were
too small not just to ensure surrender, but even to win the war against another
country. But, on the other hand, if the benefits of the dictator from the war are
much larger than from the peacetime production, the over-investment is more
probable.
4 Large vs. small war
The analysis of the paper so far has been based on a simplified assumption,
which is usually made in the literature: if both sides invest in war, I assumed
that there actually is going to be a military conflict. The problem with this
approach in the setting of this paper is that, if military expenditures are at
least partly motivated by the internal considerations, it is hard to believe that
the government will automatically use the accumulated military potential for
warfare. This issue does not exist in the model of the previous section by
construction. To show that, let me assume that the government makes two
decisions: first, the size of expenditures on armed forces, and second, whether
it attacks or not. It is easy to see that if investments are positive, the attack
strictly dominates the decision to withdraw from conflict (since the expenditures
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have already been made, and the only difference is whether there is a chance to
obtain the prize or not). Obviously in the reality the situation is different: first,
war always means additional expenditures (even if the army is well trained and
prepared to fight), and second, there is not only a prize to win, but there may
be transfers from the losing party to the winner. In this section I will examine
the second option, assuming that there are going to be transfers to the winner
if the war takes place. One can roughly make the distinction between ”small”
and ”large” wars: a small local conflict usually does not imply significant costs
for the economy in general and also does not require countries to make serious
concessions - the conflict influences only the relatively small prize. However, in
case of a large war the costs will be overwhelming for the whole country.
Reference model with large war. In order to model a large war, assume
that there is not a prize V , but a transfer, such that V can be obtained in case
of victory, but has to be paid in case of defeat. In this case the payoffs of two
countries without domestic conflict (the reference case) can be written as
pia = (1− pw)V − pwV + βa(R−ma) (17)
pib = pwV − (1− pw)V + βb(R−mb) (18)
The optimal choice of B is either
mb =
√
2V
βb
ma −ma (19)
for ma < 2V/βb or zero otherwise (since underinvesting is costly, the thresh-
old for peaceful settlement is higher). However, computing first derivative of
pia and evaluating it at the threshold ma still yields the same conditions as in
case without transfers for peaceful settlement. To conclude, war is possible if
βa
βb
∈ (.5, 2) or the investments guaranteeing the surrender of the opponent are
unfeasible (what I will, as above, ignore for simplicity).
Reference model with large war and choice of military engagement.
In the next step let me introduce an additional choice variable: let the choice
set of both countries be {Ai;Si} × mi, where Ai stands for ”attack” for the
country i and Si for ”surrender”. The war happens if both countries choose
Ai, otherwise one of the countries is assumed to surrender and has to pay the
transfer V with certainty. Moreover, assume that no war is preferred to a war
with zero revenue; this assumption is reasonable if one thinks of additional costs
of the war which can occur. In case both countries surrender simultaneously,
they both receive zero revenue from war. The game has the following timing:
first, both countries simultaneously decide on ma and mb; second, both coun-
tries simultaneously select {Ai;Si}.
Solve the game by backward induction and start the second stage. From the
conflict success function it follows that the country i receives a positive payoff
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only if mi > m−i. Otherwise payoff is negative. Hence, for any combination
of ma 6= mb at least one country will prefer to attack. Does it mean that the
other country prefers to surrender? One can easily see that surrender is never
an equilibrium, if the country made non-zero investments in army, since under
this condition investments are wasteful. Thus, in stage 2 there is no war either
if one of the countries made zero investments in the first stage, or if investments
of both countries were equal to each other. Basically, the introduction of the
additional choice of {Ai;Si} does not change the payoffs of the parties for given
mi combination: for investments in mi equal to zero payoff is always equal to
−V , regardless of whether Ai or Si will be chosen in the subsequent stage; and
the unique case when both parties surrender (obviously, investing zero in army
and simultaneously surrendering for both sides is never an equilibrium) is when
ma = mb; however, if both countries went to war under these conditions, they
would still have the same payoff from the military confrontation.
Now consider the first stage of the game. Since payoffs for given mi are the
same regardless of the choice of Ai or Si, I can use the same reaction curves
as in the reference case for large war above. First, consider the case when
both countries make equal investments in army. I can find the condition for
the equilibrium mb = ma by using the best responses from the system of three
equations: mb =
√
2V
βb
ma −ma; ma =
√
2V
βa
mb −mb and ma = mb. Then both
sides make equal investments in military capacity and do not go to war only if
βa = βb = β (and then ma = mb = V2β ). This is indeed an equilibrium: if a
country i decides to deviate from the equilibrium by investing less then V2β , the
opponent will attack and the payoff will decrease (because the expected revenue
from war is negative); if a country i decides to invest more than V2β , the payoff
of war is positive, but it is smaller than the non-realized peacetime production.
Moreover, analogeously to Proposition 1, one can show that zero investments
are never made for βaβb ∈ (.5, 2).
To conclude, the only difference between this model and the previous one (where
no option of military investments without warfare was given) is for identical
countries, which have not just the same resources R, but also the same produc-
tivity β: in this case there is ”perfect deterrence”, since both sides create equal
armies and do not go to war. Otherwise introducing the opportunity to ”opt
out” for positive investments in army does not change anything.
Country B ruled by a dictator. Now consider the case when the coun-
try B is ruled by a dictator. The interaction of the countries is determined
through a sequence of three simultaneous games:
1. Both countries make investments, i.e. decisions on ma and mb
2. Both countries make decision on {Ai;Si}
3. Dictator and population in country B make decisions on effort they put
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in domestic revolution
Payoffs are realized after the domestic revolution. Once again, I solve the game
through the backward induction.
1. The problem of stage 3 (domestic revolution) for given decisions onmi and
{Ai;Si} is almost identical to that of the analysis above of the previous
section, with the exception of the introduction of a different payoff from
war (because of the transfer setup), which is just a ”constant” for the
optimization problem of this game (as, once again, it has been in the
previous section). Then the problems of the dictator and the population in
country B for given military investments and choice of attack or surrender
(set at the previous stage of the game) and their solutions are analogous
to the previous section.
2. Consider then the second stage of the game. If mi > m−i, country i has
incentives to attack. Once again, surrender is never optimal if opponent
attacks and own military investments are different from zero. Payoff from
war is equal to zero only if ma = mb, and therefore this stage of the game
is not affected by the existence of the dictator. Once again, in equilibrium
if country i has made military investments different from m−i and not
equal to zero, it will not surrender. Once again, as in the previous case,
the choices of stage 2 do not affect the payoffs for given mb,
3. Finally, consider the first stage of the game. The analysis of zero invest-
ments in war is not really interesting, since it is very similar to that per-
formed in the previous section: once again, for very high political bias or
very high complementarity dictator will never decide to abolish the army
and to surrender. A more interesting point is the ”balance-of-power” case,
when armies’ strength for both countries is the same - this case was absent
in the ”small war” scenario. The reaction function of A did not change,
and thus one can show that A sets ma = mb if mb = V2βa . Consider, once
again, completely symmetric countries with identical peacetime produc-
tivity β, to compare the results with and without the dictator. The best
response of the dictator is given by:
θ′(mb)
4
(dβ(R−mb)+dwmb −ma
mb +ma
V )+
θ(mb)
4
(−dβ+dwV 2ma
(ma +mb)2
) = 0
(20)
if θ(mb) < 2 and
θ′(mb)
θ2(mb)
(dβ(R−mb)+dwpwmb −ma
mb +ma
V )+
θ(mb)− 1
θ(mb)
(−dβ+dwV 2ma
(ma +mb)2
) = 0
(21)
otherwise. For mb = ma = V2β the conditions can be re-written as:
θ′( V2β )
4
(dβ(R− V
2β
)) +
θ( V2β )
4
(−dβ + dwβ) = 0 (22)
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if θ( V2β ) < 2 and
θ′( V2β )
θ2( V2β )
(dβ(R− V
2β
)) +
θ( V2β )− 1
θ( V2β )
(−dβ + dwβ) = 0 (23)
otherwise. For both equations the first term is strictly positive, and the
second term is positive if dw > d, thus, equalities do not hold and the mil-
itary investments of B exceed V2βb in case of perfectly symmetric countries
and political bias exceeding unity.
The presence of the ”greedy dictator” prevents the ”perfect deterrence” for two
identical countries: intuitively, the dictator will ”over-invest” in army, because
his share from the spoils of war is larger than that from the peacetime produc-
tion, and therefore the war still happens. Anyway, the general conclusion seems
to be that introduction of a ”large war” does not change much: the only result
where equilibrium is indeed very different is that for equal countries, if there is
no dictatorship ruling them.
There is, however, a further issue of interest if one introduces the possibility
of a large war for a country ruled by the dictator. It is clear that the conditions
derived by Proposition 2 to ensure non-zero investments in war also change. For
example, political bias ensuring the non-zero military investments is now
b∗∗ =
βbR
V
1− θ′(0)R
2− θ′(0)R (24)
which for θ′(0)R > 2 is larger than in the Proposition 2. The reasons are
straightforward: now the dictator has also more to loose in case of war, and
even benefits from being stronger in internal revolution do not offset the costs
of military defeat. In case of surrender the revenue from internal revolution
is just zero; however, if the war takes place, it can be negative. Once again,
this observation is not completely weird, if one thinks of real-world experience:
the dictators can just prefer to surrender and escape from their country, rather
than to fight a war (of course, if one sets the payoff from defeat in the revolution
to be −∞ (if the dictator is caught and executed) at least with some positive
probability, things do change) - as a matter of fact, the case of Uganda-Tanzania
war I discuss briefly in the next section is very instructive from this point of view.
Unilateral aggression. Finally, consider a variation of the initial model.
Assume country A is unable to attack, so its investments are purely defensive
in the sense of Grossman and Kim (1995). Now war happens only if B chooses
to attack; if B chooses not to go to war, no war is possible and gain of both
countries from the military conflict is zero. There are two situations when this
is indeed the case. First, it is possible that country A’s political system includes
numerous veto-players preventing it from developing an unambiguous foreign
policy agenda, or that the war is somehow unacceptable for the majority of
the population (for example, because it associates extremely high costs with
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the military confrontation). The actions of the UK, France and the US before
World War II provide a good example of extreme reluctance of going to war or
the presence of domestic political constraints preventing the first strike (even at
the very early stage of the war, when the military advantage against Germany or
Japan seemed realistic). Multiple veto-players may occur also in case of multiple
countries participating in a coalition, which then requires unanimous support
to start a war. Second, it is possible that the resources of A are different for an
aggressive and for a defensive war - if, for instance, they are supplied by foreign
allies. For example, Taiwan can count on the US support in case of a defensive
war against China, but not necessarily in case of a military aggression - while it
is the US support which makes out the decisive advantage of the island in any
military confrontation with the mainland China.
Once again, solve the game by backward induction. The third stage does not
change. There is a significant change in the second stage: B will attack only if
mb > ma in the first stage. However, the most interesting changes are in the
first stage. If B were not ruled by the dictator, in case it does not attack it
makes zero investments in war effort. However, if B is ruled by the dictator, the
situation is different: now B may choose non-zero investments even if it does
decide not to go to war. It happens, specifically, if for zero revenues from war
zero investments in military effort are suboptimal and equilibrium investments
will guarantee a larger response from A. Given the reaction function of A in
the first-stage game shown above, mb < ma if mb < V2βa . On the other hand,
for zero revenue from war and θ(mb) < 2 profits of the dictator are given by
θ(mb)(dβb(R−mb)). Then, from the first order condition evaluated at 0, coun-
try B never attacks, but makes positive investments in war if θ′(0) > 1R and the
optimal mb < V2βa . It means that if the first derivative of the complementarity
function is large enough, country A creates a purely wasteful army, which never
goes to war.
5 Examples
5.1 Army and domestic repressions
The major novelty of the model presented above is that investments in army
to be devoted to an external war and the strength of the ruler vis-a-vis the
domestic rebellion can be complementary. In what follows I will provide several
examples of the instances similar to those described in the main model of the
paper in terms of timing and outcomes. I am looking at dictatorships, which
increased the strength of their military in order to combat rebellion and to start
an international war, however, lost their ”small victorious wars” and afterwards
actively used the army in the domestic struggle. As I will show, this exact
scenario has indeed been observed several times in non-democratic political sys-
tems, although these cases, to my knowledge, have so far been rarely discussed
in the literature.
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Syria: Yom Kippur War and Hamah rebellion. Hafez al-Asad’s acces-
sion to power in Syria during the ”Corrective Revolution” of 1970 was strongly
supported by the military. Although the new regime refrained from establishing
a pure military dictatorship, Asad continuously expanded the army, relying on
the military strength in both domestic and international matters. Between 1967
and 1973 the military forces of Syria increased from 50,000 to 170,000 men and
were re-equipped using i.a. the Soviet support and help from other Arab coun-
tries. Hence, Syria was among the most aggressive members of the coalition
launching an attack on Israel in 1973 (the Yom Kippur War), hoping to retake
the Golan Heights through purely military means. Although the early stage
of the war was characterized by the relative success of the armies of the Arab
countries, the Yom Kippur war ended by a serious military defeat of this coali-
tion. In addition, the war triggered the chain of events resulting in the signing
of the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement in 1979, thus preventing the formation
of a stable alliance of Arab countries Asad preferred. All in all, the Yom Kippur
war resulted in serious weakening of Syria’s position in the region and thus can
be treated as yet another example of the lost ”small victorious wars”.
However, in the aftermath of the war Syrian army was much more success-
fully involved in fighting the domestic rebellion in 1976-1981, initiated by the
Muslim Brotherhood. Although the struggle between the Brotherhood and the
ruling Ba’ath party can be attributed already to the 1960s, the conflict esca-
lated significantly in the second half of the 1970s. The revolt posed a serious
threat to the Syrian leadership, so that in June 1980 Asad himself barely es-
caped death after a terrorist attack. However, the revolt was put to an end
through active use of the Syrian army against the opposition to the regime,
with the most prominent example of 1982 Hamah massacre. After the Broth-
erhood took control of the city of Hamah in the northern part of the country,
the Syrian army besieged it for 27 days and used artillery, tanks and combat
helicopters to restore governmental control, resulting in significant causalities
among the civilian population. Some of the 12,000 men troops were withdrawn
from Lebanon. Thus, the strengthening of the military forces, although not
successful in the war against the main external opponent of the Asad regime
(Israel), demonstrated its relative efficiency in suppressing the internal threat to
the government represented by the Muslim Brotherhood (Zisser 2001; Brownlee,
2002; Wiedl 2006). The timing and the structure of events seem to be almost
identical to the model of this paper.
Jordan: Six Day War and Black September. Jordan faced a somewhat
similar situation to Syria a decade earlier. As Syria, Jordan was a member of
the coalition of Arab states in the Six Day War in 1967, which, as the Yom
Kippur war, ended with a victory of Israel. There are of course, several differ-
ences in this case. To start with, unlike the Yom Kippur war, the Six Day War
was started with the Israeli pre-emptive attack (against Egypt - but not against
Jordan). However, one can claim that the Arab countries at least did plan an
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offensive against Israel, thus the case is still relevant for the discussion of this
paper (I will describe a similar situation in the next subsection discussing the
Russo-Japanese war). It is also the case that Jordan, unlike Syria, has been
rather a reluctant member of the coalition, although ultimately deciding to join
Egypt. However, the decision to attack Israel, even if based on misinterpreta-
tion of the early results of combat between Israel and Egypt, was made by the
government of Jordan, also taking domestic political considerations into account
(for Jordan they were probably even more pronounced than for Syria: military
success over Israel was crucial for the nation-building project pursued by the
leadership of the country at that moment). Hence, with certain caveats, the Six
Day War fits the ”small victorious wars” profile, and, as the ”small victorious
wars” we are interested in, was lost the autocratic government.
And, as Syria, Jordan faced a threat of domestic uprising almost immediately
after the end of the war. In this case the key reason for the domestic political dis-
turbance was the situation in the Palestinian refugee camps, where autonomous
political and military institutions began to emerge. The activity of Palestinian
organizations in Jordan, as of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, has been a
serious problem for the government already for at least a decade (since early
1960s), though the primary concern was not internal (the threat to the regime)
but the external (the measures implemented by the Palestinian organizations
against Israel were out of control of the Jordanian government and therefore
problematic for the country’s foreign policy). After the war Palestinian resis-
tance movements, however, turned into an issue in the domestic affairs as well.
After Karameh Operation in 1968 their prestige in the country increased signifi-
cantly; they received substantial internal and international support. Palestinian
organizations claimed quasi-fiscal and regulatory authority in the camps, and
the left wing of the resistance movements criticized the monarchy in Jordan.
All in all, after the assassination attempts on the king and the planes hijackings
in September 1970, the martial law was declared and the military forces were
used to attack the camps and the headquarters of Palestinian organizations in
Amman. Jordainan army became the key tool of fighting off the Palestinian or-
ganizations, which went on until mid 1971, when the latter were expelled from
Jordan and king Hussein successfully restored his power (Fruchter-Ronen 2008;
Nevo 2008).
In case of Jordan the strategic motive behind the establishing the army for
the purpose of the domestic conflict is not as clear as in the case of Syria: the
spread of the Palestinian refugee camps and the emergence of alternative power
centers in Jordan could have been avoided if the fight against the ”external”
enemy were more successful. However, somewhat more successful (but not deci-
sively victorious - which was, however, neither planned nor intended by Jordan)
war against Israel could as well just strengthen the Palestinian organizations
without removing the camps from Jordan, thus even encouraging the threat
to the king. Anyway, this conjecture remains purely speculative. In addition,
one could consider the Palestinian rebels an ”external” threat for Jordan as
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well - this claim, however, is likely to be inconsistent with the ideology of the
country itself, during the period in question rather intending to represent the
Palestinians as part of its own nation. It is thus not surprising that the events
of 1970-1971 are often perceived as a ”civil war”. Anyway, the key lesson from
the Black September conflict is that military forces unsuccessful in fighting the
”true” external enemy were quite instrumental in suppressing rebellion at home.
Further examples. While the examples so far closely followed the model
presented in the main part of the paper, several wars demonstrate a somewhat
similar pattern, confirming the main message of this paper (complementarity
between fight against the rebel and international war), but either deviate from
the timing of the model or provide somewhat inconclusive results regarding the
efficiency of the fight against the rebels at home. I start by considering two
further ”small victorious wars”. The fact that army has been created in order
to fight primarily the domestic opponents rather than foreign nations can be
clearly demonstrated by the case of Idi Amin regime in Uganda. The very rea-
son for the start of the Uganda-Tanzania war in 1978-1979 was associated with
the regime’s attempt to combat the rebellion, with some of the rebels fleeing
across the Tanzanian border.11 However, unlike the wars discussed above, the
Uganda-Tanzania conflict resulted in the deposition of Amin - thus the military
was ultimately unsuccessful in the fight against both domestic and foreign op-
ponents.
Similar situation was observed in Somalia after the OgadenWar against Ethiopia
of 1977-1978. The Ogaden War fits the pattern of the ”small victorious wars” I
described so far, although in this case the key reason for the Somalian defeat was
the ultimate decision of the USSR to withdraw its support (the Soviet Union
happened to be allied with both sides of the conflict). Immediately after the
war the Somalian military has been used in suppressing the rebellion against
the regime in 1978. This time the initial involvement of troops has been suc-
cessful; however, the massacre of the Majeerteen clan seems to have unraveled
the chain of events, which several years later resulted in the deposition of the
regime of Siad Barre (although probably delayed it by half a decade). Hence, in
both cases the army, although used against domestic opponents (and probably
designed to be used against domestic opponents), was ultimately not successful
- however, in both cases countries used this army to wage external wars.12
11Starting war with foreigners because of the fight of domestic opposition is by far not
a unique feature of this case: for example, the relations between Venezuela, Ecuador and
Colombia in the last decades have been severely influenced by the military operations against
rebels, sometimes crossing national borders.
12One should bear in mind though, that the success of the conflict (especially the rebellion)
observed in the real world is of binary nature (either win or loose). The model, however, makes
predictions based on expected payoffs of the conflicts. So, ultimately there is no contradiction
to the model of this paper. One should, however, acknowledge yet another common feature of
two conflicts described above, which is different from the model presented in this paper: that
the rebellion was also initiated by the military, which, however, has been combated by the
troops loyal to the dictators. In Syria and Jordan, however, military has been mostly loyal to
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Finally, other non-democratic regimes also applied their strong army against
domestic protests, although in this case a link between international wars and
domestic conflicts is less pronounced. The use of army against the domestic
opposition seems to be rather rule than an exception in Africa (see Herbst
2004). The Chinese People’s Liberation Army performance in the post-World
War II military conflicts has been mixed: it was successful in the Sino-Indian
war in 1962 and Korean War in 1950, but ultimately unsuccessful in the Sino-
Vietnamese war in 1979 and in the border disputes with the Soviet Union in
1969. On the other hand, military involvement was a key element of suppress-
ing the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 - thus, on the domestic front army
actually performed better than on the international one. However, this case
is somewhat less interesting: while it demonstrates that (given proper govern-
mental control) army can be used as the ultimate argument in both domestic
and international disputes, there was no unambiguous ”small victorious war”
(ultimately lost by the dictator) present - and therefore the case is of lesser
importance for this paper.
5.2 Diversionary war
As we have discussed above, the model can be applied in a somewhat more gen-
eral setting, also analyzing the diversionary wars, where governments initiate
an international conflict in order to gain internal political support. In this case,
however, some re-definition of parameters is required. Assume, for instance,
that the ”rebellion” is initiated not by the population, but by a different po-
litical group (”revolutionary party” or ”civil rights movement”), which requires
public support for its success. Assume further that mi represents not (only) the
quantitative increase of the military forces and equipment, but also the invest-
ments in propaganda, boosting morale and increasing the chances of military
success. Then one can assume that there is once again a complementarity be-
tween propaganda investments directed to the military forces and the general
population, which is then ”diverted” from the support of the revolutionaries,
which is reflected by the θ(.) in the conflict success function (6). However, the
effects can be similar to those increasing the ”quantitative” strengthening of the
army - the well motivated forces should optimally, under the assumptions of a
small victorious war, be used for international war as well.
While the diversionary wars have been well studied in the literature (unlike
the case I have presented above), there is still at least one prediction of the
model, which is of interest in this scenario: the complementarity between do-
mestic and international conflicts and the political bias. In order to start the
war, either political bias should be high enough (if the complementarity is not so
obvious), or the complementarity should be significant (for small political bias).
In what follows I will consider three examples of often cited ”small victorious
the incumbent ruler.
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wars” (see also Levy, 1988), which allow me to provide at least some anecdotal
illustrations for the interplay of these two factors in the logic of aggression of
non-democracies.
The existence of the complementarity between the international conflict and
the domestic success of the dictatorships seems to be supported in a number of
cases of potential ”small victorious wars”. The probably most famous example,
the Falklands War of 1982 between Argentina and the UK, seems to be strongly
influenced by the interests of the military and the ”diversionary” motives (for
a detailed discussion see Levy and Vakili, 1992, and Oakes, 2006). First, the
war could reinforce the unity between individual groups within the military in
Argentina and re-shape the balance between the factions of the military elite,
which at that moment was ruling the country. Specifically, it seems to be the
navy which was expecting an overproportional benefit from the war and could
probably shift the army as the traditionally dominant service. It is even claimed
that the support that Leopoldo Galtieri, the head of the military government
since 1981, received from the navy was conditional on the involvement in Falk-
lands. Second, Argentina experienced an increasing pressure from the domestic
civilian opposition requesting return to the democracy and changes in the eco-
nomic policy-making. Some examples include scheduled strikes organized by the
General Confederation of Labor and the multi-party coalition (Multipartidaria)
established to support reforms. It is claimed that Galtieri expected to com-
bine the ”successful” war with general elections, which aimed to ”transfer” the
military victory into the domestic success. To conclude, the complementarity
between the domestic and the international war seems to be relatively high.
In the same way, the first war in Chechnya in Russia of 1994-1996 also seems to
be motivated by the political instability of the central Russian government.13
Once again, two factors contributed to the emergence of war. On the one hand,
the parliament elections of 1993 demonstrated an enormous popularity of the
nationalist movements among the Russian population; the administration of
president Boris Yeltsin faced the accelerating loss of public confidence due to
the hardships of the economic crisis and the deep transition recession in Russia.
So, a ”hardliner” position for Chechnya would allow Yeltsin to position himself
as a proponent of a ”stronger” Russia and partly beat the potential nationalist
opposition on its own territory, as well as increase the public support of his gov-
ernment (see e.g. Bowker, 2004). Second, however, the war in Chechnya was
associated with an attempt to prevent further secessions of other regions, or
at least further increase of their autonomist aspirations, which at that moment
were considered at least to be possible (though in the final account the secession
threats turned out to be non-credible and even the claims of higher autonomy
were never institutionalized and easily removed by the central government un-
der Vladimir Putin, see Libman, 2009). In the same way, the second Chechen
13Although de-jure the conflict represents an internal war between the central government
and one of the regions, de-facto it seems to fit the logic of this paper quite well.
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war in 1999-2000 had clear implications for the electoral success of Vladimir
Putin, who was ”appointed” the Yeltsin’s successor exactly during this period
and immediately concentrated on solving the problem of Chechnya. This war
constitutes, by the way, one of the examples when ”small victorious wars” in-
deed turned out to be victorious - at least in the short run. Putin’s success
in the presidential elections of 2000 is often clearly attributed to the military
success in the Caucasus (see McFaul, 2000).
The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, though an also often-cited example of
the diversionary wars initiated by autocracies (specifically, by the Russian Em-
pire), is not so easy to interpret. To start with, there is no clear conclusion as
to who actually started the war (the first military strikes seem to have been
implemented by the Japanese, but since no international law on the official dec-
laration of wars existed at that moment, the interpretation of individual actions
is not so simple), and what is even more important, which intentions did the
Russian political leadership actually have. On the one hand, the imperial gov-
ernment of Nicholas II expresses a clear and significant interest in the expansion
in the East Asia, which is claimed to be particularly promoted by the emperor
himself - he is sometimes described to have developed an ”obsession” with the
region (Geller, 1997). Hence, the clash of interests between Japan and Russia
was inevitable due to the purely external political logic. On the other hand,
Russia indeed experienced a strong increase of the revolutionary activity in the
first half of the 20 century associated with the spread of the Social Democratic
ideology and the emergence of the Socialist Revolutionary movement. From
that point of view a war against Japan could come in handy. Even in this case
it is questionable whether the war could increase the popularity of the govern-
ment - whether it was successful or not .14 Finally, there seems to be conflicting
evidence whether the Russian government indeed was interested in the war or
simply did not put enough effort to avoid it due to the misperception of the
Japan’s ability to attack (Perrie, 2000). Anyway, at least for some groups of the
Russian political elite the diversionary war logic seemed to be highly attractive
(see Geller, 1997; Airapetov, 2004).
Hence, the internal complementarity between the international and the domes-
tic conflicts was either straightforward (Chechen war, Falklands war) or at least
possible and expected by some factions of the elites (Russo-Japanese war). In
the next step let me consider the political bias. The model predicts, that exactly
in the case with the most questionable complementarity one should observe the
14There is some anecdotal evidence that the intellectual part of the society was extremely
critical towards the war from the very beginning: for instance, there have been cases of enthu-
siastic greetings to the Japanese prisoners of war in the European provinces of Russia by the
local population. On the other hand, there have been several cases of patriotic manifestations
of students in St. Petersburg in the beginning of the war, so the assessment of the percep-
tion of war is once again inconclusive. As for the uneducated masses of the Russian rural
population, the only group indeed showing some support towards the war were the Siberian
peasants, expecting the access to the land resources of the newly conquered territories, see
Airapetov, 2004.
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highest political bias, given there was indeed a war started. As for the Falklands
islands, the economic gains from the war can be considered negligible: basically,
the islands are claimed to be potentially attractive from the point of view of the
oil deposits, but their commercial value is yet to be determined even as of 2010.
Chechnya does have well-recognized oil deposits, and also possesses strategically
important location from the point of view of the pipeline routs, but during the
Yeltsin rule the central government had extremely limited control over both
private companies dominating in the oil extraction and, what is even more im-
portant, state-owned corporations like Gazprom and Rosneft, which basically
were run almost independently by their management with the support of par-
ticular groups in the elite. So, the rents to be obtained from the Chechen war
are also questionable. The situation is different for the Russo-Japanese war.
In the case of the Far East expansion of the Russian Empire, there have been
significant rents, at least for some groups of the elite involved in the exploration
of economic resources of Manchuria and Korea, where large economic projects
were initiated. In this case it is also likely that for these groups of the elite
(associated with the emperor himself) the gains from exploring these projects
were significantly larger than those from investing resources in the peacetime
production. It is a different problem though that Far East was not the only
priority for the Russian foreign politics,15 so that even in this case the political
bias could not have been extremely high - but at least it seems to be larger than
in two other cases considered in this section.
To conclude, political bias and complementarity effects indeed seem to be present
in all three cases. If the complementarity effect is high enough, even a very low
political bias suffices to start the war. For lower complementarity effects political
bias required, as predicted by the model, should be higher. In addition, how-
ever, one should notice that in both Russian cases (Chechen war and Japanese
war), the political bias, either relatively high or relatively low, seems to never
reach the level sufficient to generate military investments ensuring the unilateral
surrender of the opponent - once again, as discussed in the model. In both cases
the initial military forces mobilized for the war were rather limited as compared
to the overall military potential of the country (although gradually increased).
In the case of the Russo-Japanese war the initial stage of the conflict was in-
deed clearly focused on the attempts to wait until the reinforcements from the
European part of Russia arrive (though this strategy turned out to be disas-
trous from the military point of view). On the other hand, the second Chechen
15In Russia this multitude of goals reflected itself in a multitude of decision-making centers
involved in development the overall strategy of the country and the political decisions regarding
Far East in particular. To provide one example, when the Russian military minister A.
Kuropatkin was informed about the re-deployment of troops in Korea in 1903, he was surprised
to find out that any Russian troops were located in the region at all. There was a permanent
competition between different directions of policy - Port-Artur and Dalny harbors, Manchuria
and Korea as main priorities etc., ee Airapetov 2004. One should notice that this multiplicity
of goals seems to be present in almost all cases of military conflicts between large and small
states (Mack, 1975).
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war with an extremely high level of complementarity16 was also associated with
significant military investments for this conflict - finally, ensuring at least the
short-term military victory.17
6 Conclusion
This paper examined the problem of a ”small victorious war”, looking at two
factors potentially influencing the military expenditures of the countries: degree
of complementarity between external security and internal peace and political
bias of the dictator. First, it shows that in case of a conflict for an exogenous
prize, regimes with high complementarity and with high political bias tend to
overinvest in military effort, even if the expected payoff for the entire nation
goes down (and thus the war is inefficient from the point of view of the overall
rent obtained by the nation). Of course, the investments may become so high,
that the opponent simply surrenders, and there is once again no war (and it is
more likely to be the case for a dictator with a very high political bias effect).
In some cases, a fully rational and well-informed dictator will start the ”small
victorious wars” she is doomed to lose, although without the presence of the
political bias and complementarity this war would not have been started. The
anecdotal evidence, first, provides examples of (more or less) successful applica-
tion of the army against the domestic enemy after the unsuccessful international
war, and of the interplay between the political bias and the complementarity
effect in terms of the initiation of war. Finally, in case of a large war the model
shows that it is possible to observe the development of large military forces,
which, however, are purely wasteful and never engage the external enemy, be-
ing created exclusively for the internal purposes - if the aggression, however, is
unilateral.
The study acknowledges its limitations. In particular, even in the empirical
cases discussed in the paper (both of diversionary wars and application of mili-
tary against the domestic rebellion after lost wars), the countries seem to make
decisions for the ”small victorious war” scenario, in fact being in the ”large
war” world. As I have stated in the introduction, following the approach of
the economics of conflict, this paper developed a model, where inefficient over-
investments in the military capacity happen without any informational asym-
metries. However, information and misperceptions can matter in terms of dis-
tinguishing between the small and the large war: from that point of view an
attempt to start a ”small victorious war” in a real world is very likely to be
associated with significant miscalculations of the opponent’s strength, ability
16The public perception of the importance of victory was much higher after the terrorist
attacks in Moscow in 1999 than in 1994, when Chechnya constituted just one, and probably
not the most important, example of autonomist aspirations of the regions, and seemed to
be perceived by the population as a problem less important than, for example, the ongoing
economic crisis.
17The long-term stability in the region of Northern Caucasus and Chechnya is, of course,
still questionable.
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and readiness to fight (see also Fearon, 1995). Nevertheless, although the issue
of information is of course highly relevant for explaining the causes of war, it
still seems to be important to show that the inefficient military investments in
the ”small victorious wars” can be predicted even in an extremely simple model
with full information.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) Since the first order condition for the country B is
∂pib
∂mb
=
maV
(mb +ma)2
− βb = 0 (25)
one can immediately find that the country B sets its investments in warfare equal to
mb =
√
V
βb
ma −ma (26)
if ma <
V
βb
and zero otherwise. The derivative of the payoff of country A given the reaction of
country B is
∂pia
∂ma
=
1
2
√
βbV
ma
− βa (27)
Evaluating the derivative at ma =
V
βb
one can see that it is non-negative if and only if βaβb
≤ 12 .
Hence, if this condition holds, the country A in equilibrium chooses the level of military expendi-
tures such that the country B invests zero in warfare and ”surrenders”. Symmetrically, if βaβb
≥ 2,
country B in equilibrium chooses the level of military spending ensuring the surrender of country
A. The conflict therefore takes place if βaβb
∈ (.5, 2). One should bear in mind that the level of
mi =
V
βj
, i 6= j may exceed countries resources. It is true, for instance, if Vβi > R. If this inequality
holds for i = a, the lower bound of the ”peaceful interval” disappears, since A can never invest
sufficient amount of resources to ensure surrender of B. Obviously, for i = b the opposite holds, and
the proof is complete.
Furthermore, one has to examine the case when both sides invest zero in warfare. According to
(26), optimal response for opponents zero investments is also zero, and hence, the probability of
winning ought to be .5. However, (0; 0) is never a Nash equilibrium: assume that the opponent
invests zero effort in war - than by investing an infinitely small amount of effort in war one wins
with probability 1, and hence, for any positive V there is an incentive to deviate from (0; 0). It is
therefore also not considered further.
(ii) Consider equation (25) for mb = 0. Then the first derivative is larger 0 (and hence, non-
zero investment in war for B is optimal) if V > βbma. But ma ≤ R by definition, and therefore if
V > βbR, the condition holds always. The result for A is derived symmetrically.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) Consider the reaction curve (13) given mb = 0. Then one has to
check the condition
θ
′
(0)dβbR +
dwV
ma
− dβb > 0 (28)
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(reaction curve (14) is irrelevant, since it is calculated at θ(mb) > 2, while by assumption θ(0) = 1).
Substitute ma =
V
βb
(condition ensuring surrender in the reference case). Then one obtains
θ′(0)dβbR +
dwV βb
V − dβb = θ′(0)dβbR + βb(dw − d) > 0 (the first term is positive, the sec-
ond is positive since dw > d. For smaller ma the second (positive) term of (28) is larger, while
other terms do not change, and hence the expression is also positive. Thus, investing zero in exter-
nal warfare is never optimal.
(ii) Consider equation (13) and compare it with the first-order condition (25). One can see that if
dw = d an mb setting (25) to be equal to zero makes the second term of (13) equal to zero. How-
ever, the first term of (13) is still positive, and hence, the root of (13) should be larger than that of
(25). For (14) the result can be established analogeously. Now, if dw > d, for mb =
√
Vma
βb
−ma
the second term of (13) (and (14)) is positive, while the first term is positive anyway. Therefore,
investments optimal in the reference case are suboptimally low for the case of a dictator.
(iii) Now assume ma = R (maximal investment possible for country A). Substituting it in the
condition (28) and re-arranging terms one obtains the result of the Proposition.
(iv) In the same way, result follows from re-arranging terms in (28) for ma = R.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Substitute into (11) the optimal response of A ma =
√
Vmb
βa
−mb and
calculating the first order condition yielts
θ
′
(mb)[βb(R−mb) +
dw
d
√
V βamb] + θ(mb)[−βb +
dw
d
√
V βa
2
√
mb
] = 0 (29)
Assume the equation does have a root. The first term is always positive. The second term can
be positive or negative. It is clear then that the equilibrium can exist only in the range where
the second term is negative (and its absolute value is equal to that of the first term). Consider
mb ≤ Vβa and analyze the sign of the second term for this range of mb. For this purpose consider
−βb+
dw
d
√
V βa
2
√
V/βa
> 0. The condition holds if βaβb
≥ 2dw
d
. If this condition does hold, for all mb <
V
βa
the second term of the equation (29) is positive. Thus, the root of (29), if βaβb
≥ 2dw
d
, ought to
be not smaller than Vβa , and therefore ensure unilateral surrender of A. Considering (12) in the
analogeuous manner yields identical results. If the first-order conditions do not have a root, B
invests the maximal amount possible in warfare by assumption, and therefore the only case when
surrender of A is not ensured is if the amount of investments necessary is not feasible. The proof is
complete
Q.E.D.
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